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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last century of the United States' history, few questions have
consistently remained a flashpoint of controversy and heated debate as the
issues concerning the migration of foreign nationals to the United States.
However, where one must begin to sort out the merits of the arguments,
both pro and con, is a quandary. A mere overview of all aspects of the U.S.

*
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College of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, J.D. expected in May 2000. The
author has over five years of professional experience as a legal assistant with Rosner and Associates
Co., L.P.A. in the area of employment-based and family-based United States immigration and
nationality law.
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immigration laws, even absent editorial commentary, is a formidable task.'
This Article will concentrate its scope on the issue of employment-based
immigration to the United States, and particularly on the H-iB
nonimmigrant visa category for aliens2 in "specialty occupations." 3 The
following illustrates the impact of this portion of the immigration law.
* Satish Appalakutty, a native of Bombay, earned a master's degree in
computer management in India by age twenty-five.4 Armed with this
advanced educational credential, Mr. Appalakutty earned $3,000 per
year in his home land.5 However, since coming to the United States
under the H-1B visa program, he now earns $50,000 per year as a
consultant.6 Despite his apparent good fortune, Mr. Appalakutty's
future is uncertain. While he hopes to eventually obtain United States
permanent resident ("green card") status, he finds himself living with
three other Indian consultants in a two bedroom apartment, saving his
money for the day he may have to return to India.7
* United States employers who utilize this visa program find themselves
at odds with an element of the law that cuts-off the H-i B supply line
after an arbitrary cap, predetermined by Congress, is reached. This
causes U.S. high-technology employers, large and small alike, great
concern. A 300-employee Northwest software company finds that the
limit impacts their growth and expansion.9 A six-employee company
which conducts medical research, some funded by federal grants, sees
the cap as jeopardizing their ability to hire one key player for their
operation. 1

1. One commonly referenced summary of U.S. immigration law, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION
LAW SOURCEBOOK (1999 edition), written in the form of a concise outline, is a paperback as thick

as a major metropolitan telephone directory.
2. The term "aliens," usually pertaining to non-U.S. citizens, is used pervasively throughout
U.S. immigration law. However, many practitioners find the word to carry a cold and impersonal
connotation. Therefore, wherever possible, this article will refer to non-U.S. citizens as
nonimmigrants, foreign nationals, individuals and employees.
3. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (1998)).
4. See William Branigin, Visa Program,High-Tech Workers Exploited,Critics Say; Visa
Program Brings Charges of Exploitation, WASH., July 26, 1998, at Al.
5. See id
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Keith Ervin, Visas Haven't Eased Tech Hiring Hunt,SEArLETIMES, Mar. 19, 1999,
at C3.
9. See id.
10. See id
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* The limit even affects our nation's ability to educate our own students
at post-secondary educational institutions in major metropolitan
centers." "It causes a lot of anxiety because it means some critical
research projects are delayed . . . .It means that once
the best
2
candidates are found, we're not able to bring them in."'
This Article will examine the numerous claims of U.S. employers that
they cannot fill professional-level job openings with home-grown U.S.
workers, and the complaints of those who oppose the importation of
foreign professional labor. By shedding some light on these broad
questions, we should put into proper perspective the motivating elements
behind our ever-changing United States immigration laws, separating the
valid impetuses from the rhetoric. This should serve to paint a clearer
picture of the actual state of affairs affecting our labor needs, and to
suggest courses of action designed to stabilize and to correct the U.S.
employment-based immigration system.
First, this Article will provide a cursory overview of the H-1B
temporary professional specialty occupation visa program. Having laid this
groundwork, we will then examine the various criticisms of the H-lB
program, identifying the groups both supporting and opposing the issue,
and their reasons for their positions. Finally, based upon this review of the
political and economic climate affecting the evolution of the H-1B visa
system, this article will propose recommendations for improving the
system to better serve U.S. employers to compete effectively in the global
economy, both in the long-term and the short-term. The reader will find
that much of the existing law is sufficient to serve the needs of U.S.
employers to compete effectively. However, the delegated agencies
charged with administering these laws do so with great inefficiency, poor
attitude and poor quality control. Thus, while some aspects of the process
can certainly stand reasonable updating, many key areas of the controlling
laws and regulations are quite satisfactory, if only they were properly
implemented or enforced.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE H-l B NONIMMIGRANT
VISA PROGRAM

The primary framework for the current immigration law of the United
States was established by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act

11. See Mae M. Cheng, Colleges: INS FailingProfessors/ Visa Shortage Creates Woes at
Universities,NEWSDAY, June 13, 1999, at A8.

12. Id. (quoting Elizabeth Barnum, Assistant Dean for International Services of New York
State University at Stony Brook).
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of 1952' 3 (INA or the Act). The Act has been amended several times since
then, most notably by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA),' 4 the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT90), 5 the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)16
and most recently by the American17 Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 1998 (AC WIA).
Section 205 of the Act provided for the charter version of the H- 1B visa
category. 8 Prior to the Act being substantially revised by the Immigration
Act of 1990, the H-1B visa category applied to a wide variety of
nonimmigrant workers including professionals, "[c]ertain entertainers,
athletes, artists and 'prominent' people... ."" IMMACT90's revisions to
the Act restructured the immigration law by redefining the H-lB category
to consist of nonimmigrant employees engaged in fashion modeling,
certain projects for the Department of Defense" and "specialty
occupations," defined as "occupation[s] that require[ ]- (A) theoretical
and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or
its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United
States."'" The other occupations that formerly qualified for H-1B
classification were relegated to new sections of the Act created by
IMMACT90 22

13. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(cbdified at 8 U.S.C. 1101 (1998)) [hereinafter INA or The Act].
14. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1101 (1998)) [hereinafter IRCA].
15. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)(codified at 8
U.S.C. 1101 (1998)) [hereinafter IMMACT90].
16. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, Div. C., 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996)(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1998)) [hereinafter
IIRIRA].
17. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, Title IV of Div. C, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1998)) [hereinafter
ACWIA].
18. See Angelo A. Paparelli & Mona D. Patel, The ImmigrationAct of1990: Death Knellfor
the H-JB?, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 29, 29 (Jan. 14, 1991).
19. Id.
20. See INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(a) (1998) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)
(1998)). This article will not discuss the application of the H-IB visa category to fashion models
or Department of Defense workers.
21. INA § 214(i)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (1998)). Under the pre-IMMACT90
version of the INA, these jobs were referred to as "professional occupations." This article will often
refer to jobs defined under this section of the INA interchangeably under both the old and new
nomenclature.
22. See 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(O) (1998) (referring to the category for persons of
extraordinary ability); see also 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(15)(P) (1998) (referring to the category for
athletes).
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The regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1990 amendments to the
Act created "labyrinthine requirements."23 Among these is a requirement
for H-1B employers to attest that the H-l B nonimmigrant will be paid at
least ninety-five percent ofthe prevailing wage for the specialty occupation
in question.24 In addition, the H-lB employer was now required to attest
that hiring the H-i B employee would not adversely affect working
conditions of workers "similarly employed." 2' Finally, the 1990
amendments required H- 1B employers to also attest that the nonimmigrant
was being hired in the absence of any strike or lockout.26 Collectively,
these three attestations comprise the core underlying predicate for the H- IB
visa category: the Labor Condition Application (LCA).27 The H-lB
category requires the employer to file the LCA with the Department of
Labor (DOL), and have it certified prior to petitioning the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) for H-lB visa status for a particular
nonimmigrant employee.28 In addition, Congress wrote into the
Immigration Act of 1990 an annual limit of 65,000 H- lB "visas '' 29 that can
be issued in a given fiscal year, and limited the maximum stay of an H-lB
nonimmigrant in the United States to six years.3 °
The 1990 amendments to the Act were generally met with positive
acclaim, insofar as they crafted the H-1B category to meet the
technological explosion ofthe 1990s. An article analyzing the amendments
noted that "editorial writers around the country have been quick to praise
Congress and the President for legislation that many believe will enhance
the ability of U.S. companies to compete successfully in the global
economy."'" While one can speculate whether the course of events in the
U.S. economy and high-technology job market following the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1990 were coincidental, opportunistic or abusive, the
stage was now set for U.S. employers to hire foreign nationals with
baccalaureate educations to fill professional-level positions when those
jobs could not be filled by domestic labor.3 2 Since this decade saw a

23. Loma Rogers Burgess, HNonimmigrants,in 1999-00 IMMGRATION &NATIONALITY LAW

HANDBOOK, Vol. I, IMMIGRATION BASICS 203 (American Immigration Lawyers Assoc. ed., 1999).
24. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.73 1(a) (1998).
25. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.732(b) (1998).

26.
27.
28.
29.
imposed
30.
31.
32.

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.733(b) (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(ii)(B)(1) (1998).
See id.
This article will explain that the language in the Act concerning a Congressionally
cap on H-I B "visas" is a misleading characterization.
See Paparelli & Patel, supra note 18, at 29.
Id.
See Constantine S. Potamianos, The Temporary Admission of Skilled Workers to the

United States Under the H-1B Program:Economic Boon or Domestic Work Force Scourge?, 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 789, 789 (1997).
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dramatic increase in vacant professional-level positions, particularly in the
high-technology sector, the role of the H-lB visa program became clear:
if a U.S. employer cannot find U.S. workers33 ready, willing, and able to
fill a professional position, use the H- lB program to fill the position from
the global labor market in order to remain competitive.34 The decade of the
1990s has seen spectacular economic growth for the United States
economy." This growth has translated into the creation of hundreds of
thousands of new specialty occupations in the United States.36 Since there
were not ample U.S. workers to fill these vacant jobs, employers relied
heavily upon the H-lB visa program to fill these important positions.37 In
the U.S. Government's Fiscal Year 1996, the INS reported that the H-lB
cap of 65,000 had been reached for the first time.3" However, it turned out
that the INS was mistaken; they miscounted the H- 1B visas issued in Fiscal
Year 1996.' 9 Nonetheless, the incident sent shockwaves through H-1B
reliant business community, and prompted the INS to develop a way to
better count H-1B visas charged against the Congressionally imposed
cap.40 In Fiscal Year 1997, the H-lB visa cap was reached in late August,
approximately five weeks before the end of the fiscal year.4 1 This caused
an immediate backlog of pending H-lB petitions at the INS already
charged against the cap for the next fiscal year before Fiscal Year 1998
even began.42 The country's economy continuing to voraciously consume
H- IB visas to fill high-technology jobs, the INS announced the exhaustion
of 65,000 H-lB visas for Fiscal Year 1998 on May 11, 1998-more than
four and one-half months before the end of Fiscal Year 1998, 43 causing a
33. See 29 C.F.R. § 501.10(u) (1998)(defining the term "U.S. worker" as a member of the
U.S. labor pool who is either a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, i.e., "green card" holder).
34. In addition to the three employer attestations embedded in the LCA requirement for the
H-IB category, there are many other safeguards built into the law to protect U.S. workers from
being adversely affected by the hiring of H-1B foreign nationals to fill vacant professional jobs.
35. See Michael D. Towle, Visa Entries Expanded to Fill High-tech Jobs More Skilled
Workers Would Benefit Texas, Economist Says, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 6, 1998, at
1.
36. See id. (reporting that 345,000 high-technology jobs remain open in the U.S.).
37. See id.
38. See H-lB Annual Limit Not Reached After All, INS Says, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1184, 1184 (Sept. 9, 1996).
39. See id.
40. See Annual H-lB Limit to be Reached This Year, INS Announces, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1137, 1137-38 (Sept. 9, 1996).
41. See H-lB Cap Reached, INS and State DepartmentSet Procedures, 74 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1294, 1294 (Aug. 25, 1997).
42. See INSReports on H-lB PetitionGrants in New FiscalYear, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1935, 1935 (Dec. 16, 1997) (reporting that on October 1, 1997, the first day of Fiscal Year 1998,
8, 668 H-lB visa petitions had already been charged to the Fiscal Year 1998 H-IB visa cap).
43. See Fiscal Year 1998 Numerical Limitation Reached for H-lB Nonimmigrants, 63 Fed.
Reg. 25,870-71 (1998).
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Fiscal Year 1999 backlog of 17,000 H-i B petitions by the first week of
September 1998."
In response to combined pressure from H-lB employers fearing their
H-1B supply line may be severed, and members of Congress concerned by
the very real threat of high-technology jobs being moved overseas,
lawmakers, spearheaded by Senator Spencer Abraham45 (R-Mich.),
introduced new H-I B legislation intended to increase the H- 1B visa cap.46
Senate Bill 1723, 47 dubbed the American Competitiveness Act, despite
being introduced in March 1998,48 met substantial resistence and was not
expected to be signed into law before the end of the session. The wideranging impediments to the new legislation included: general opposition
from restrictionists; dissatisfaction from the Clinton Administration of
some of the bill's terms; budgetary appropriations issues necessary to keep
the Government running; and distractions generated by the Monica
Lewinsky scandal. In spite ofthese roadblocks, the 105' Congress reached
a compromise acceptable to the Clinton Administration. Thus, the
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998
(ACWIA) was folded into the 1999 omnibus appropriations bill49 and
signed into law by President Clinton on October 21, 1998.50 The ACWIA
provides for many changes to the H-i B visa program, most notably the
following:
" A temporary increase in the number of H- 1B visas available over the
next three Fiscal Years.5
"

New burdens and penalties for certain H-lB employers.

2

44. See CongressReturns to Work H-1B Relieffor Remainder ofFiscal Year 1998 Unlikely,
75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1225, 1225 (Sept. 4, 1998).

45. Senator Abraham served as the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
during the 105' Congress.
46. See Lawmakers Introduce H-lB Overhaul Legislation, Other Bills, 75 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 357, 357 (Mar. 16, 1998).

47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
50. See State DepartmentIssues FinalRule ProvidingSpecial Immigrant Statusfor NATO
Civilians,75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1726, 1727 (Dec. 21, 1998).

51. See ACWIA § 411 (increasing the H-IB cap to 115,000 for Fiscal Year 1999 and Fiscal
Year 2000, then reducing the cap to 107,500 for Fiscal Year 2001, and returning to 65,000 for
Fiscal Year 2002).
52. See ACWIA § 412 (creating new attestations required ofcertain H-l B employers relating
to willful violators of the H-1B regulations, displacement of U.S. workers, and good-faith
recruitment efforts).
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* Modifications to enforcement provisions and monetary penalties.5 3
" An enhanced H-lB filing fee to fund scholarships and training
endeavors for U.S. workers.54
" A more
clearly defined method of counting H-iB visas against the
55
cap.

* A mandatory report to Congress on age discrimination in the computer
science industry. 6
" A mandatory report to Congress on the usage of foreign national
personnel under the H-l B visa program. 7
With the implementation of the ACWIA, and the subsequent promulgation
of the related regulations, the H-i B visa program has evolved into its
current state. Having laid this cursory groundwork, this Article will now
examine the components of the H-lB visa program in its current form, as
applied in real world hiring situations.
A. The Prevailing Wage Requirement
As stated above, U.S. employers are required to pay H-lB
nonimmigrants "[tihe prevailing wage level for the occupational
classification in the area of intended employment[J" 58 Alternatively, the
employer must pay the H-l B nonimmigrant "[t]he actual wage paid to the
employer's other employees at the worksite with similar experience and
qualifications for the specific employment in question[,]" 5 9 if the actual
wage is higher than the prevailing wage.6" Obviously, the object of such a
requirement, which is codified in the DOL's regulations, is to prevent U.S.
employers from hiring cheap foreign labor for wages unacceptable to U.S.
workers. How the prevailing wage is determined is a study unto itself, and
a source of much contention, particularly by the DOL.6

53. See ACWIA § 413.
54. See ACWIA § 414.
55. See ACWIA § 416.
56. See ACWIA § 417.
57. See ACWIA § 418.
58. 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(I)(ii) (1998).
59. 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(!)(i) (1998).
60. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(1) (1998).
61. The DOL has dwelled over the issue of the validity of data for prevailing wage
determinations in microscopic detail, the current manifestation of which is set forth in GAL 2-98,
the most recent of several General Administration Letters issued by the DOL on the issue of
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There are several methods set forth in the DOL regulations for
determining the prevailing wage for an H- IB specialty occupation. One of
the most commonly used methods is asking the State Employment Security
Agency (SESA)62 in the state where the employee is to work, to determine
the prevailing wage for the position. 3 This is accomplished by filing a
short prevailing wage determination application form with the SESA,
which usually lists: 1) the job title; 2) the duties for the position; 3) the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles' (DOT) code for the position; 4) the
minimum education and experience requirements for the job; and 5) the
city where the H-lB employee will work. The SESA, in turn, determines
what the prevailing wage should be, based on the criteria set forth in the
application and the wage compensation data it has gathered in various
surveys and databases. Unfortunately, a SESA prevailing wage
determination is binding upon the H- I B employer once it is used to file an
LCA. 65 The binding nature of this determination can be problematic in
cases where the SESA determines a prevailing wage which is absurd due
to error, or due to insufficient data on hand to produce an accurate
sampling for a determination. Also, SESA determinations take time, and
tend to delay the already slow H-1 B process.66
Due to this bureaucratic uncertainty and inefficiency, as well as the risk
involved, many employers and practitioners prefer to utilize a faster, more
flexible and more predictable option-a wage survey. The DOL
regulations permit H-lB employers to determine the prevailing wage by
consulting a published wage survey that includes "the occupation within
the area of intended employment published by an independent authoritative
source.., within the 24-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the employer's application., 67 By consulting a wage survey, an employer
immediately knows whether or not the salary being offered to the H-l B
employee falls within the prevailing wage regulations. If the employee's

prevailing wage since IMMACT90.
62. A State Employment Security Agency (SESA) is generally the state-level labor
department. In Ohio, the SESA is the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.
63. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2)(iii)(A) (1998).
64. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) is the DOL's antiquated over-and underinclusive attempt to classify and catagorize every occupation conceivable via a unique code
designated to each occupation. For example, the DOT lists only six professional-level occupations
with the word "computer" in the title. However, the DOT goes so far as to detail the duties,
experience requirements and working conditions for four occupations with the word "worm" in the
title: Worm-Farm Laborer, Worm Grower, Worm Packer, and Worm Picker.
65. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2)(iii)(A)(l) (1998).
66. The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) posts reported processing times
for various government agencies on their members-only website, www.aila.org. A recent tabulation
from AILA's website in the first quarter of 1999 listed SESA prevailing wage determinations to
take as little as two days in several states, to as long as eight weeks in Florida.
67. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(b)(3)(iii)(B) (1998).
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proffered wage is below prevailing wage, the employer can decide whether
to forego hiring the foreign national, or to raise the employee's proffered
salary. By consulting the wage survey, the employer can make these
decisions without fear of being bound by an incorrect SESA wage
determination.
Prevailing wage issues rarely arise, as most H-lB employers pay
foreign nationals well above the prevailing wage.68 This is due to the
simple fact that a U.S. company will always be inclined to hire a U.S.
citizen for a position, if possible, in order to avoid having to undergo the
H-1 B process. Thus, it logically follows that, when there are no available
U.S. citizen candidates, the qualified foreign nationals are in a position to
demand higher salaries. The U.S. employers have no choice but to offer
competitive salaries, lest they risk losing the only qualified candidates they
can find for vacant professional positions. This is an example of how U.S.
employers are now being forced to consider not only the entire United
States as a labor market, but the entire world.
B. The Labor ConditionApplication Requirement
The next step in the H- IB process is the LCA. The LCA is a short form,
filed by the employer with the DOL regional office having jurisdiction over
the H-lB employee's place of employment. On the LCA, the employer
attests that it will pay the H-lB nonimmigrant the prevailing wage, by
comparing the wage offered to the determined prevailing wage, in the
geographic area of employment.69 The regulations in this regard are very
complex and require the employer to create and maintain a public file
containing required documentation including: 1) the method by which the
employer determined the H-I B employee's salary; 2) two notices of the
H-lB employee's hire and salary which had to be posted in two
conspicuous location for ten business days, in the event there is no
collective bargaining representative to whom notice can be given;70 and 3)
evidence that all worksite employees were provided with specific
instructions of how to file a complaint with the DOL relating to the H-lB
employee.7
The scrupulous requirements of the LCA on the employer

68. Employers who utilize the H-1B program generally do so out of necessity, and out of a
sense of obligation to comply with the law. If they were not interested in doing so, they would not
go to the time and expense of the H-I B process, nor would they be interested in creating the public
records and filing damaging attestations with the Federal Government concerning matters such as
prevailing wage.
69. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(3) (1998).
70. Rarely would one encounter a circumstance where professional-level H-1B employees
are unionized, and notice must be given to a collective bargaining representative.
71. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.734 (1998).
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notwithstanding, it is interesting to note that the DOL itself violates an
important component of its own regulations. Specifically, the DOL's
regulations require it to "make a determination to certify or not certify the
labor condition application within 7 working days of the date the
application is received .. . .""The American Immigration Lawyers
Association's first quarter 1999 processing report of LCA processing times
for all ten labor department regional offices indicates that only one regional
office73 was processing LCAs in seven days or less. Even though the DOL
recently moved to an automated fax-and-scan system for adjudicating
LCAs, with a purported processing time of as little as forty-eight hours,74
the system quickly revealed its glitches. The DOL now [meaning, Summer
1999] processes LCAs in about two to four weeks-an improvement, but
still not compliant with their own regulations. However, the new LCA
system appears to be improving.
C. The H-1B PetitioningProcess
Once the U.S. employer has properly determined the prevailing wage
for the specialty occupation in question, and has obtained a certified LCA
from the DOL, the employer is in a position to prepare and file the actual
H-l B petition with the INS. The petition itself consists of two Department
of Justice forms: Form 1-129 and the H Classification Supplement.75 Form
1-129, inter alia, calls for information regarding the U.S. employer
(including location and financial information); the current nonimmigrant
visa status of the employee (if any); a brief description of the job; the dates
of intended employment; and the salary offered.76 The H Classification
Supplement also calls for a description of the job being offered, the
employee's current occupation, and a summary of the employee's
employment history.77
The information called for on Form 1-129 and the H Classification
Supplement alone is not sufficient to satisfy the INS and DOL regulations
for approval of H-lB visa status. Therefore, petitioning employers
72. 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(b) (1998).
73. DOL Region X, which includes Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington.
74. See DOL Issues Notice of ProposedRulemaking to Implement Changes to the H-lB
Program,76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 37, 41 (Jan. 11, 1999).
75. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(D) (1998), 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(2) (1998).
76. See Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker, Form 1-129.
77. It is interesting to note that the H Classification Supplement, a form specifically intended
for H-lB visa petitions, does not request information regarding the beneficiary's post-secondary
education, a requirement for H-lB eligibility. However, the L Classification Supplement, a form
intended for use in support of intracompany transferee petitions, does request the beneficiary's
educational background. Ironically, educational background is irrelevant to L visa petitions which
utilize the L Classification Supplement. It is as though the persons responsible for drafting the two
forms confused the requirements between the two visa categories.
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customarily include a letter of support with H-1 B petitions. These letters
usually describe the company, the specialty occupation being offered to the
beneficiary, and the individual's qualifications for the position.
Documentary evidence supporting the petition can be referenced in the
letter and enclosed, or appended. to the letter as exhibits. Documentary
evidence required for the H-iB visa petition must include a certified
LCA.7 s Other required evidence for an H-1B visa petition includes
documentation which demonstrates that the beneficiary possesses the
necessary licensure to perform the specialty occupation, a U.S.-issued
baccalaureate degree, or its equivalent.79 In addition, the petitioner's
support letter usually includes corporate documentation to evidence the
organization's legitimacy and financial viability (e.g. company product
brochures, annual report, Form 10-K, etc.).
Once the H-iB employer has obtained the certified LCA, and has
prepared, finalized and signed Form 1-129 with H Classification
Supplement and the supporting petitioner's letter, the company may file the
petition with one of the INS's four regional service centers having
jurisdiction over the H-lB nonimmigrant's intended place of
employment.8 0 The filed petition must be accompanied by the required
filing fee." Currently, the filing fee for an H-1B petition is bifurcated.
There is a required base filing fee of$110.82 However, as discussed supra,
the ACWIA added a provision to the Act for an enhanced filing fee of an
additional $500.83 This $500 filing fee must come from the petitioning
employer.8 4 It cannot be paid by the beneficiary, nor can the beneficiary be
required to reimburse the petitioner in any way. 5 The enhanced fee can be
waived if the petitioning entity is "[a]n institution of higher education," 6
"[a] nonprofit entity (including but not limited to hospitals and medical or
research institutions) that is connected or associated with an institution of
higher education,"" or "[a] research organization that is either a nonprofit
organization or entity that is primarily engaged in basic research and/or
applied research or a United States Government entity whose primary
mission is the performance or promotion of basic research and/or applied
research.""8

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(b) (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C) (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(2)(i)(E) (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b) (1998).
See id.
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(19)(ii) (1998).
See ACWIA § 415.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(19)(iii)(A) (1998).
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(19)(iii)(B) (1998).
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(19)(iii)(C) (1998).
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Once the H-lB visa petition has been filed with the proper service
center, the INS will process the case. Adjudication times at the INS vary
greatly depending upon current workload, as well as the service center at
which the case is filed. The Vermont Service Center and the Nebraska
Service Center, which have jurisdiction over the Northeast and the rest of
the northern tier of states, respectively, consistently have the faster
adjudication times of the four INS service centers-generally somewhere
in the vicinity of three to eight weeks.8 9 However, the INS service centers
in Texas and California, which handle cases from the Southeast and the
Southwest, respectively, are notorious for having relatively slow
processing times and extremely poor channels of communication.9 ° In fact,
INS headquarters in Washington, D.C., under pressure from Silicon Valley
and other H-i B employers in the West, recently ordered the faster service
centers to slow down their adjudication processes to permit the slower
California Service Center to close the gap on H-lB adjudications before
the cap on available visas for Fiscal Year 1999 was reached. 9' Therefore,
an H-l B visa petition, from the prevailing wage phase to final approval,
may take anywhere from one to four months.
In drafting the legislation from which the INS and DOL regulations
governing the H- IB visa program are promulgated, Congress must satisfy
the lobbying efforts of U.S. employers in dire need of foreign national
professionals to fill open specialty occupations, as well as those
constituents and anti-immigration organizations which view the H-lB
program as detrimental to U.S. workers and associated wages. The result
is the creation of laws with enforcement mechanisms intended to detect
abuse of the program, and to punish the abusers. This was particularly
apparent during the drafting and implementation of the ACWIA. In the
realm ofthe H- I B program, the primary mechanism, delegated to the DOL,
involves sanctions against employers for LCA violations.92
The Act, as amended, now provides for a fine of up to $1000 per
89. This is an approximation based upon typical INS processing times for those jurisdictions
over the last few years.
90. Each of the four service centers has a telephone number through which the public may
reach an INS officer to inquire as to the status of a particular case. The lines are always busy. By
pressing "redial" continuously for 15 to 30 minutes, one may usually get through to the Vermont
or Nebraska service centers, remaining on hold for approximately another 15 to 30 minutes to reach
a human. The Texas and California service centers, however, are virtually unreachable by telephone
lest a caller is willing to spend, literally, hours redialing the contact number to get through to the
INS. Even then, one must remain on hold for at least an hour before reaching an officer. To add
insult to injury, all the INS telephone status lines are prone to cutting off callers, sometimes after
they have waited patiently on the line for as much as an hour or more.
91. See Charles Piller, The Cutting Edge Special Visa Law May Have Backfired for Tech
Firms, Immigration: California Companies Seek Foreign Experts, but the Application Process Is
Slower than in Other States, Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 5, 1999, at CI.
92. See ACWIA § 413(b)(l)(E)(i).
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violation for an H-lB employer's failure to comply with the LCA
requirements and attestations, including a penalty of $5000 per violation
for an employer's willful failure to comply, or misrepresentation of fact.93
Other sanctions against an employer violating the LCA regulations include
the payment of back pay to the nonimmigrants adversely affected, and the
possibility of the employer being barred for one year from being permitted
to hire nonimmigrants in the H, L, 0 and P visa categories.94 There are
even additional attestations required of so-called "H-lB dependent
employers."95 These additional attestations require the employer to state
that no U.S. worker is being displaced in favor of an H-lB employee from
ninety days prior to filing the LCA, to ninety days after the H-lB visa
petition is filed,96 and that the H-lB employer has undertaken reasonable
recruiting efforts in good faith to locate U.S. workers for the position.97
Under the amended law, an H-lB dependent employer is one that:
(1) has 25 or fewer full-time equivalent employees in the U.S.
and employs more than seven H-lB nonimmigrants; (2) has
26-50 full-time equivalent employees in the U.S. and employs
more than 12 H-lB nonimmigrants; or (3) has more than 50
full-time equivalent employees in the U.S., at least 15 percent
of whom are H- lB nonimmigrants9 8
While the lion's share ofthe H- I B enforcement provisions is incidental
to the LCA requirements, and thus, comes under the charge of the DOL,
it is also worth noting the INS's role in enforcement. Generally, the iNS
is responsible for acting as a gatekeeper and for mounting investigations,
thus primarily engaging in enforcement activities regarding smuggling,
fraud, terrorism, detention and the patrol of our borders.9 9 However, the
INS has been delegated enforcement and investigative powers concerning
the employment of individuals" ° pursuant to the IRCA.
Under the IRCA amendments to the Act, the INS implemented what is
commonly known as the "Form I-9" requirement. This law mandates that
all U.S. employers verify that any person hired after the enactment of the
law complete a Form 1-9 to evidence that the new hire is authorized to

93. See id.
94. See INA § 212(n)(2)(C) & (D) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 182(n)(2)(C) & (D) (1998)).
95. ACWIA § 412(b)(1) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (1998)).
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(E) (1998).
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 182(n)(1)(G) (1998).
98. DOL IssuesNotice ofProposedRulemakingto Implement Changesto the H-lB Program,
76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 37, 39 (Jan. 11, 1999).
99. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS § 103.1
(1999).
100. "Individuals" meaning any human in the U.S., including United States citizens.
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work in this country.' 2Employers who find themselves subject to an INS
"employer sanctions"' investigation usually do not even know what a
Form 1-9 is. Those that do almost always have them filled out incorrectly,
which in and of itself can be a chargeable offense under the INS's
regulations.'
Although intended to place further controls on aliens in the United
States, the IRCA foisted upon all U.S. employers this blanket employment
verification measure, and U.S. employers are generally inept at complying
with the ostensibly simple Form 1-9 requirements. In fact, an immigration
law journal published the following regarding an employer sanctions
forgiveness amendment to the Act:
This provision has become known as the "Sonny Bono"
amendment, because Rep. Bono (R-Cal.), who is also a
restaurant owner, was one of its sponsors. In one memorable
exchange during a congressional hearing, Rep. Bono
criticized the 1-9 verification system, calling it a "lousy
system" and one that "unfairly penalizes employers." He
opined that most employers "have no clue" how to fill out the
required paperwork, and are forced to waste time and
resources fulfilling the verification requirements, worrying
about employee fraud, and often having to defend their hiring
practices. "All I wanna do is sell a plate of pasta," Rep. Bono
said. "Why do I have to be the bad guy?"'
discriminating forgiveness of
Notwithstanding Congress'
unsophisticated U.S. employers for technical violations of the employer
sanctions regulations, there exists no such latitude in the enforcement
provisions inherent in the extremely complex and volatile H-1B visa
program. One can only imagine Congress' reaction to pleas from
employers for the relaxation of the H-i B requirements because the system
is "lousy" and "unfair," that they "have no clue" how to prepare and file
the required paperwork, and that all they want to do is sell high-technology
products and services."'

101. See INA § 274A (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1998)).
102. This is the INS's jargon for an audit of an employer's Forms 1-9, payroll and personnel
records for compliance with the IRCA.
103. See INA § 274A(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1998)).
104. Juan P. Osuna, The 1996 ImmigrationAct: Employer Sanctions,Antidiscriminationand
Work Verification, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1749, 1750 (Dec. 20, 1996).
105. To paraphrase the late Congressman Bono.
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III. CRITICISMS OF THE H-lB PROGRAM

It is interesting to note the difference in approaches taken by proimmigration and anti-immigration advocates in terms of commentary on
the H-lB visa program, much of which was considered by Congress in
amending the law. While there was no shortage of sources for statements
opposing immigration and the H- IB program, it was difficult to find sound
and logical data supporting those arguments.' °6 The Federation for
American Immigration Reform (FAIR) is a Washington, D.C. based
"non-profit, public interest of concerned citizens who share a common
belief that the unforeseen mass immigration that has occurred over the last
30 years should not continue.' 0 7 FAIR's website'0 8 makes many broad
statements in support of their beliefs that U.S. immigration, at all levels,
should be stemmed. Under the heading "Do Employer-Sponsored
Immigrants Fill Special Job Needs?,"'0 9 FAIR states that "[m]any
Americans would find this idea-that American know-how and ingenuity
must be imported from abroad-absurd, and a brief look at the facts about
what business is actually doing with its part of the immigration system
backs them up."" 0 FAIR then cites a few 1996 INS statistics concerning
employment-based immigration,"' lists them by occupational grouping,
and concludes "[iut is hard to credit claims by big business that they can't

106. For example, the AFL-CIO has made numerous statements opposing the H-1B visa
program unsupported by data. Therefore, the author telephoned the organization's toll free number
to their Washington, D.C. headquarters. Upon doing so a gentleman (who answered the telephone
"Tony Wang's Chinese Pizza") advised that he did not know why the AFL-CIO was opposed to the
H-IB program, but that he knew that they were. Messages left at the organization's media and
public relations desks were not returned. Also, the author's requests to have data supporting their
argument mailed to the author remain ignored at the time of this writing.
107. See The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) Internet website entitled
"About Us," <http://www.fairus.org/html/aboutus.html> (visited on June I, 1999).
108. Until recently, FAIR's home page, www.fairus.org, featured a map ofthe world with large
animated arrows originating from all parts of the globe, terminating in the contiguous United States
with the word "FULL" flashing across the Great Plains. The Internet site has since been toned
down.
109. FAIR (visited June 1, 1999) <http://www.fairus.org>.
110. Id.
11. The terms "immigration" and "immigrant" are not to be confused with nonimmigrants.
In general, an immigrant is any non-citizen who has the authority to reside and work in the U.S.
indefinitely. A nonimmigrant is a person who enters the U.S. for a temporary stay and must return
to his or her home country once that stay has expired. The term "immigrant" is defined in the Act
at INA § 101(a)(I 5) by exclusion by indicating that an immigrant is "any alien" who does not fall
into any of the nonimmigrant categories defined in that section. This part of the FAIR website deals
only with immigrants.
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do without aliens in most of these occupations."" 2 While FAIR cites INS
employment-based immigration statistics and occupational breakdowns,
one may fail to see how such headcounts support a conclusion that
employment-based immigration is bad.
Insofar as the H-1B visa program is concerned, FAIR covers some
ground. However, much of it is very confused, and almost none of it is
supported by relevant data. FAIR's Internet resources feature a page
entitled "An Engineer's Thoughts on H-lB.""' 3 It is the text of a twoparagraph, anonymous letter from an engineer who is having difficulty
finding a job. He states "[m]y recent job hunting experience tells me that
it is difficult to get any job as an engineer, even after possessing an
engineering degree and job experience. [ ] If you can tell me why I can't
even get any calls in this 'hot market' please let me know.""' 4 Clearly, this
hardly rises to the level of a legitimate ground for opposing the H-lB visa
program. Indeed, the hapless engineer did not even mention the H-lB
program. Another FAIR reference to the H-1B visa program being
unneeded is posted on their website, and is entitled "Sen. Harkin Defends
American Worker." ' 5 This so-called defense of the U.S. worker and attack
on the H-lB visa program amounts to a quotation from Senator Tom
Harkin (D-Iowa), threatening to "have the whole bill read."' 6 The Senator
went on to say "[w]e'll be here for days. There is no need for that bill, and
I do not want it in the omnibus.""' 7 No support is provided by FAIR, the
anonymous engineer, or the Senator for their posture on these statements
featured on FAIR's website.
The Executive Director of FAIR, Dan Stein, spoke before the
International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House
Committee on International Relations on February 25, 1998."18 The
statement was purportedly made "for the record of the hearing on a
proposal to raise the 65,000 annual ceiling on H-1B temporary worker
visas... [and] explains why this proposal is not based on actual need and

112. FAIR (visited June 1, 1999) <http://www.fairus.org>.
113. An Engineer'sThoughts on H-1B, FAIR (visited June 1, 1999) <http://fairus.org>.
114. Id.
115. See Sen. Harkin Defends American Worker, FAIR (visited June 1, 1999)
<http://www.fairus.org>.
116. Id. (quoting an except from an article by Martha Angle, Follow the Money (Oct. 14,
1998)).
117. Id. The bill to which the Senator referred was signed into law by President Clinton and
is now the ACWIA.
118. Mr. Stein's statements before the Subcommittee, given during the congressional hearing
on whether to increase the then-65,000 visa cap on the H-I B program, are memorialized on FAIR's
website: The Sham High-Tech Worker Shortage, FAIR (visited June 1, 1999)
<http://www.fairus.org>.
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is not in the national interest.""' 9 Unfortunately, many of the points made
by Mr. Stein confuse the H-lB visa program with the permanent labor
20
certification application requirement for immigrant visa classification. 1
While Mr. Stein does point out that the long-term solution to the problem
of a perceived domestic high-technology shortage of workers is to better
educate United States citizens in our own educational system,' 2 ' his
statements do not support a call for the reduction of the H-1B visa cap in
the short-term.
FAIR's statements aside, the H-i B visa program has been accused by
other sources of being rife with abuse. Despite the enforcement
mechanisms in the law specifically intended to deal with such issues,
discussed supra,few formal complaints are brought by aggrieved U.S. and
foreign national workers, 22 and the DOL admits to not being able to
effectively enforce LCA provisions. 123 These accusations concern issues
such as "benching," the practice of removing an H-i B worker from the
payroll when his or her services are temporarily not required, the evolution
of contract H-lB labor mills known as "job shops," prevailing wage
violations and other violations of the LCA rules. These abuses will now be
examined.
Virtually all the H- IB and LCA abuses introduced infra are incident to
a cottage industry colloquially known as job shops. 124 Job shops are
companies whose sole function is to hire personnel with skills in specified
areas, and send those employees to perform services for the job shop's
clients, usually at the clients' facilities. 125 The client pays the job shop a fee
for the employee's services. 126 The job shop pays the employee a salary,

119. Id.
120. The labor certification requirement for immigrant visa purposes is found at INA §
203(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(C) (1998). The process generally requires a test of the labor
pool by advertising the intending immigrant's job in the local market. No such advertising is
generally required for the H-IB program. Mr. Stein's statements to Congress, confusing this
requirement with the H-IB nonimmigrant visa program, include: "employment ads frequently
include positions for whom no employment action is intended"; and "current data on the H-1B
program shows that only 42 percent of the labor market certifications under the program are
computer related." See The Sham High-Tech Worker Shortage, FAIR (visited June 1, 1999)
<http://www.fairus.org>.
121. See id.
122. See Branigin, supra note 4.
123. See id. (referring to the comments of John Fraser, Acting Chief of the DOL's Wage and
Hour Division).
124. See Stuart Anderson, WidespreadAbuse ofH-IBs andEmployment-Based Immigration?
The Evidence Says Otherwise, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 637, 637 (May 13, 1996).
125. See Labor Certification, LCA Programs Do Not Protect US. Workers, Audit Finds, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 653, 653 (May 13, 1996).
126. See B-1 in Lieu ofH-1 Visas: A Brouhaha Brews, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1495 (Nov.
23, 1992).
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and takes a fee for placing the employee. 1" Frequently, the employee is
required to enter into an adhesion contract with the job shop, which
contains substantial penalties'28 for breaching the term of the employment
contract, or for going to work for one of the job shop's clients.' 29
Indian nationals consume nearly half of the available H-lB visas in a
given fiscal year-forty-four percent be specific. 3 ' The reason for this is
economic. For example, an Indian computer professional in India, holding
a master's degree, earns less than $3,000 per year.'13 However, in the
United States, this same individual can earn $50,000 per year through ajob
shop under the H-lB program. 32 Therefore, it is easy to understand why
there is such a tremendous influx of professionals coming to the U.S. to
work on H-1B visas from countries such as India. This is the same
rationale under which impoverished Mexican citizens illegally enter the
U.S. to work: wages north of the Rio Grande are much higher than those
in Mexico--so much higher, in fact, as to substantiate the risk of being
caught and deported. 3 3 Just as a U.S. citizen is willing to relocate to
another city or another state in pursuit of a better job or higher wages, so
does the global labor pool, using whatever means available to better their
lives. If one holds a degree and works in an occupation meeting the INS
definition of a specialty occupation, the H- lB program can be a means to
a better life.
3
Six out of the seven most ravenous users of the H-lB visa program1 1

127. This contract labor industry has existed for years in the United States, and continues to
be practiced by such well-known organizations as Area Temps, Manpower, Interim Personnel and
Kelly Services. However, in the H-IB context, job shops are in the business of placing degreed
computer programmers and engineers, as opposed to secretarial, administrative and factory
assembly workers.
128. See Branigin, supra note 4. These penalties may be on the order of $10,000 to $20,000.
See id
129. See id.
130. See Id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. The INS reported having apprehended 3,679 illegal aliens between July 21 and August
30, 1996. This total included 3,590 Mexicans alone. The INS reported that these "apprehensions
have freed up over $46 million in annual wages for U.S. workers." INS Targets Worksites,
Apprehends Over 3,600 Undocumented Workers, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1191, 1991-92 (Sept.
9, 1996). This translates into only about $12,500 per year, or $6 per hour, earned in the U.S. by
each illegal alien caught during that period. According to a 1992 report, factory wages in Mexico
were only about $1 per hour, or one-tenth the comparable wage in the United States. See U.S.,
Canadaand Mexico ProposeHistoric Free Trade Agreement, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1005,
1005 (Aug. 17, 1992). This puts into perspective the great differential between wages earned in the
U.S. and in Mexico.
134. See Branigin, supra note 4. The six biggest users of the H-1B visa program are Mastech
Systems Corp., Tata, Syntel, HCL America, ComputerPeople Inc. (U.S.-owned company), and
Wipro, Indotronix. See id. (citing to data from the INS).
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are companies that are either owned by Indian nationals, or which are
subsidiaries of companies headquartered in India.' None of them
manufacture or provide any entrepreneurial products or services; they are
all job shops. 3 6 It should be noted that these organizations are not the hightechnology employers who are lobbying Congress to relax the H-lB
requirements so they can fill open professional positions and remain
competitive. It is information technology companies like Sun
Microsystems, Inc., Microsoft Corp., Texas Instruments, Inc., and nonhigh-technology employers from Nike and Adidas America to public
schools, theaters and manufacturing concerns who feel the pain associated
with a domestic professional labor shortage and are lobbying Congress for
relief.' 37 The job shops only exist to fill the needs of companies such as
these, more quickly than the slow government bureaucracy will allow. 138
These U.S. employers are asking Congress to streamline the H- l B program
to make it more workable, in order to allow them to be more competitive.
The only benefit job shops can realize by relaxed H-1B requirements
would be to hire and place more professionals, and make more money as
a result of the increase in volume. The more the H-l B program is restricted
or slowed, the greater the need for H-l B professionals from job shops.
Another important factor to recognize here is an easy way for a job
shop to circumvent the H- IB process. Of the seven top users of the H- 1B
visa program, three of them are U.S. subsidiaries of companies
headquartered in India. 139 The L visa program, as mentioned supra,exists
to permit the transfer of personnel from related companies abroad to the
United States. 40 By hiring a professional at the Indian company and
employing him or her in India for at least one year,' 4' the professional can
then be transferred to work at the U.S. subsidiary for a period of five years
as a specialized knowledge employee, 42 or for a maximum of seven years
as a manager. 4 3 The L visa classification is devoid of any of the
attestations associated with the LCA requirements of the H-lB visa

135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Ronald Rosenberg, High-Tech SOS is Answered FromAfar, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Mar. 14, 1999, at Business.
138. In fact, one could logically argue that job shops, in the H-1B sense, would cease to exist
if the Federal Government could streamline the H-lB visa program to a point as to allow U.S.
employers to hire foreign professionals as quickly as they could be provided by ajob shop. Thus,
it very well may be the Government's own bureaucracy which creates the need for job shops in the
first place.
139. See Branigin, supra note 4.
140. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l) (1998).
141. See id
142. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(12) (1998).
143. See id.
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program. The U.S. employer is not bound by requirements to pay
prevailing wage, to post notices at the job site, or to maintain a public file.
There is no cap on L visas. Further, employers that would otherwise be
classified as "H- I B dependent," and required to recruit and attest that they
are not displacing U.S. workers, would sidestep those requirements
altogether. Accordingly, the anti-immigration faction's attention on the
H-1 B program creating adverse employment and wage conditions for U.S.
workers may be misplaced. The L visa program could easily be used to
perpetrate the very evils anti-immigration groups fear-many of them
legally. At least the H-lB program contains the necessary enforcement
provisions to keep the program honest. It is the province ofthe INS and the
DOL to enforce those provisions, and for Congress adequately to fund
those agencies so they may do theirjobs satisfactorily. As any child learns
at a very young age, any rule without teeth is bound to be broken.
As introduced earlier, one of the practices job shops are accused of is
benching: placing an H-lB employee in an inactive status at little or no
compensation until the job shop employer can place the employee at a
client's site.' 44 Even before the implementation of the ACWIA, this
practice violated H-I B regulations and the underlying LCA requirements
in at least three regards.
First, placing an H-lB employee on inactive status amounts to a
"material change[ ] in the terms and conditions of employment""' within
the meaning of the INS's H-1B regulations. Under these rules, such a
change in employment requires the H-1B employer to file an amended
petition with the INS reflecting the change in employment.' 46 Of course, by
doing so, the INS would deny the amended petition because the H-l B and
LCA regulations do not provide for the approval of an H-l B petition in
such circumstances.
Secondly, benching an H-l B employee is a clear violation of the preACWIA prevailing wage requirements of the LCA and H- IB regulations.
Technically, however, an H-lB employee doing nothing is not a
professional specialty occupation, nor does it have a corresponding
prevailing wage. Thus, under the pre-ACWIA regulations, the practice of
benching should have prompted the DOL to enforce the prevailing wage
regulations, discussed supra, and the INS to revoke the H-lB visa
petition.'47
Thirdly, the INS recently issued an advisory opinion on a similar issue.
An immigration attorney asked the INS whether an H-l B employer could
legally continue to pay laid off H-l B employees their above-prevailing-

144.
145.
146.
147.

See Branigin, supra note 4.
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E) (1998).
See id.
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1 1)(iii)(A)(3) (1998).
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wage salaries and provide benefits, while the U.S. employer assisted them
in locating successive H-I B employment with another company through
an outplacement service as part of a standard reduction in force severance
policy provided to their employees. 4 ' Thomas W. Simmons, the Chief of
the INS's Business and Trade Branch, responded to the attorney by
indicating that an H-lB nonimmigrant's status in the U.S. is predicated
upon providing services in a specialty occupation.'4 9 Once the services
cease, the employee's H-lB status terminates and he or she must either
depart the United States or change status. 5 ' Accordingly, under this
rationale, a benched employee is not providing services in a specialty
occupation, is not in status, and must depart the U.S.
The pre-ACWIA rules and policies on inactive H-lB employees
notwithstanding, in the ACWIA, Congress muddied the H-lB waters
further by implementing two provisions. First, section 413 of the ACWIA
contains a "no benching" rule, which requires an H-lB employer to "pay
H- I B nonimmigrants the required wage for the full hours specified on the
H-I B visa petition even if the beneficiary is in a nonproductive status due
to a decision by the employer .... Violation of this provision is considered
' 51
a violation of the wage requirement and subject to the same penalties."'
This regulation would seem to fly in the face of the INS's opinion that a
nonproductive employee is no longer in H-lB visa status, regardless of
compensation.
The second rule set forth by the ACWIA that confuses this INS policy
is the requirement that H-l B employers "must offer H-l B nonimmigrants
benefits and eligibility for benefits . . . on the same basis, and in
accordance with the same criteria as are offered to U.S. workers.' 52
Thomas Simmons' advisory opinion, which was issued after the ACWIA
was signed into law, relies on the notion that an H-lB nonimmigrant's
status is based upon the provision of services to the H- IB employer. Once
the employee's services cease, the nonimmigrant' s H- I B status terminates,
despite the fact that the employer may be attempting to secure employment
for the H-l B worker. ' There would appear to be a fine line between aj ob
shop placing an employee in an inactive status with full pay between work
assignments, and a non-job shop laying-off an employee temporarily with
full pay until new employment can be secured, a benefit the employer is
148. See INS Discusses Status of H-IB and L-I Nonimmigrants Who are Terminated, 76
INTERPRETER RELEASES 378, 378 (Mar. 8, 1999).

149. See id.
150. See id.
151. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS Assoc., Section-by-Section Summary of the H-1B
Legislation as of: October 13, 1998, AILA MONTHLY MAILING, 1051, 1053 (Nov. 1998).

152. Id.
153. See INS Discusses Status of H-IB and L-1 Nonimmigrants Who are Terminated, 76
INTERPRETER RELEASES 378, 378 (Mar. 8, 1999).
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providing to all of its laid-off employees. Thus, the INS would appear to
be specifically instructing U.S. employers in the latter case to violate the
"no benching" provision of the ACWIA, requiring payment of full salaries
to temporarily inactive H-l B employees.
Mr. Simmons' advisory opinion also appears to conflict with proposed
rulemaking by the DOL which acknowledges that an H-lB employer is
required to comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act.'54 Naturally,
an H- I B employee taking unpaid family leave would be in non-productive
status, terminating his or her H-1B status according to Mr. Simmons'
opinion. It would also violate the requirement that temporarily inactive
H- l B employees continue to be paid, as required by the ACWIA. It would
appear that Congress, the INS and the DOL should carefully draft these
statutes, regulations and advisory opinions so that they do not run afoul of
each other. Until that happens, U.S. employers of H-lB nonimmigrants
must remain on guard.
The ACWIA also imposes a penalty of up to $1000 per violation for
H- IB employers "for requiring an H- IB nonimmigrant to pay a penalty for
leaving the employer's employ prior to a date agreed to by the
nonimmigrant and the employer."' 55 While it would appear to protect an
H-I B employee from languishing as a sort of indentured servant of the
H-1B employer,'56 such breach penalties and non-compete clauses are
commonly utilized in all forms of contract employment, not only those
relating to H-lB nonimmigrants. The ACWIA acknowledges that such
contract provisions are subject to scrutiny under state law, as is the case
with all employment contracts.' 57 However, Congress is requiring the
employment contracts for H-l B workers to be subject to the limits of state
law, plus the penalties imposed by the ACWIA. Thus, an H-i B worker
under contract is actually being granted more protection under the law,
than a similarly situated U.S. worker. Accordingly, it may be possible for
this provision to be tested for impeding the right of private parties to
contract.
There are allegations that the H-1B visa program drives down the
wages of U.S. workers in professional specialty occupations. 5 8 However,
as referenced supra, convincing supporting data on these allegations is
difficult to locate. David A. Martin of the AFL-CIO testified before the

154. See More on the DOL's ProposedRule Implementing Changes to the H- IB Program,76
INTERPRETER RELEASES 105, 110 (Jan. 15, 1999).
155. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., supra note 151, at 1053.

156. H-i B visas are employer specific, i.e. they permit the nonimmigrant to work only for the
H- 1B employer in the job and location, and for the wage specified in the H- lB petition. Thus, even
without this ACWIA provision, the H-I B employee is, in effect, an indentured servant.
157. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., supra note 15 1, at 1053.
158. See FAIR (visited June 1, 1999) <http://www.fairus.org>.
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House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims on April 21, 1998.159 On
the AFL-CIO's behalf, Mr. Martin stated that "the H-lB program 'rigs the
marketplace against U.S. workers""' 6 and that "[information technology]
wages are not rising significantly to indicate a shortage.' 6' The AFL-CIO
did not support its allegations with any data, and Mr. Martin left the
62
hearing to make a flight, thus making himself unavailable for questions.
Dr. Norman Matloff of the University of California at Davis also testified
that there was not a shortage of high-technology professional workers, and
63
stated that only two percent of applicants are hired into such positions.
Dr. Matloff also "stated that there is age discrimination in the information
technology industry, and those employers want to hire new graduates and
foreign nationals who are 'indentured servants."" '
In response to these allegations, Mr. Harris Miller of the Information
Technology Association of America testified that the shortage of hightechnology professionals in the U.S. is very real "and cited numerous
independent and industry surveys disputing allegations that there is no
wage increase in the [information technology] occupations.' 65 With regard
to the age discrimination issue, Mr. Walter Payson of an organization for
the professional workforce over fifty years of age, The Senior Staff,
"acknowledged that there is a bias in this country against hiring older
workers, but that many of these workers were only interested in part-time
consultancy positions.' 66
Arguments and statements that a high-tech labor shortage in fact exists
are legion. 67 One of the more informative proponents of this side of the
H-lB debate is Randel K. Johnson, who made a statement before the
Subcommittee on March 25, 1999 on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce. 68 Mr. Johnson cited to the DOL's Bureau of Labor Statistics

159. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASsoc., Summary of House Immigration

Subcommittee Hearing on Immigration Workforce Issues, available at <http://www.aila.org>.
(visited on May 27, 1999).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See HearingsBefore the HouseJudiciaryComm. Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims,
106th Congress (Mar. 25, 1999) (statements of William T. Archey, Pres. of the American
Electronics Assoc., and Randel K. Johnson, Vice-Pres., Labor and Employee Benefits, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce); Ervin, supra note 8; Rosenberg, supra note 137.
168. See HearingsBefore the House Judiciary Comm.Subcomm.on Immigration and Claims,
106th Congress (Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of Randel K. Johnson, Vice-Pres., Labor and Employee
Benefits, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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employment projections from 1996 to 2006.169 According to Mr. Johnson,
this U.S. Government study shows that "the fastest growing occupations
were to be found in the computer and data processing services industry,
which was expected to more than double its employment size to 2.5
million workers by 2006. " "17 Mr. Johnson cited to employment growth
rates in the information technology industry on the order of 103 to 118
percent in that period. 7' Mr. Johnson pointed out that a similar conclusion
was reached by the Congressional Research Service. 72 Of additional
service was Mr. Johnson's reference to a survey conducted in 1998 by
Price Waterhouse Coopers in which seven out often respondents "ranked
the 'Lack of skilled/trained workers' as a major potential barrier to their
own company's growth over the next twelve months.'
The statement
continued, "[t]o put this ranking in perspective it was ranked significantly
higher than other issues such as increased taxation, legislative/regulatory
pressures, the lack of consumer demand, profitability/decreasing profit
margins and lack of investment capital.' 74
Mr. Johnson noted a finding by the American Council of International
Personnel which found "its 300 members alone spent over $350 million in
support of higher education,.. . career development programs and K- 12
pre-collegiate education."' 75 He cited a survey by Training Magazine,
conducted in 1998, which found that employers of 100 or more individuals
"spent $60 billion on formal, structured training programs.' 76 Perhaps Mr.
Johnson's most convincing statement was the following conclusion:
"Employers do not spend millions and billions of dollars for the fun of it.
They are doing so because they cannot find the qualified workers they
need., 177 Thus, it would seem apparent that H-lB employers' claims that
they cannot locate ample and adequate professional labor to fill hightechnology positions are supported by substantial, independent data,
including studies and surveys conducted by the DOL, and commissioned
by Congress itself.
Additional, support exists for the argument that a shortage of

169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See id. (citing to a commissioned report dated August 8, 1997 entitled The
Education/Skill DistributionofJobs: How is it Changing?).
173. Randel K. Johnson, IncreasingNumbers ofSkilled lmmigrants,STATEMENT OF THE U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ON: IMPORTANCE AND SHORTAGES OF QUALIFIED WORKERS IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY, To: SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS OF THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. (Mar. 25, 1999).

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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professional workers exists in the United States. Mr. Johnson's statement
to Congress noted that the:
San Diego Chamber [of Commerce] has indicated a shortage
of workers in the technology field, specifically in engineering
and electrical manufacturing .... The Richmond area is

feeling shortages specifically in the manufacturing industries
and in the teaching profession ....In Vermont, the Addison
Chamber of Commerce is working closely with the education
community and linking its efforts with the business needs in
an effort to meet the shortage of workers in the technology
fields. The New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce stresses
the needs of the manufacturing and utility industries. Its
efforts are to identify 'best practices' which describe ways
problems associated with
that organizations are combating the
78
worker shortages across the state.1
An editorial in the Wall Street Journal last year points out that "Silicon
Valley prefers to hire the best and the brightest, many of whom happen to
be employed under our HI-b [sic] visa program.'7 In maligning Lamar
Smith, a Republican Congressman from Texas, for his staunch opposition
to relaxed H-1B regulations, the editor mentioned a spattering of
quotations and studies supporting an increase in the number of H-IB visas
issued each fiscal year.180 The newspaper accused Congressman Smith of
"Congress should
failing to see "economic realities,"'' and concludes
' 82
up.'
loosen
should
Smith
Lamar
loosen the quota.

The quota referred to in the editorial piece, of course, is the
Congressionally imposed cap on H-1B visas. Since there is a perceived
high-technology/professional labor shortage in the U.S., this ceiling on
annually available H-1B visas is a source of much contention. The
centerpiece of the ACWIA is its provision which raised the H-1B cap,"8 3
at least in the short-term. As discussed supra,the pre-ACWIA 65,000 visa
cap was reached in each of the last three fiscal years-in Fiscal Year 1998
and Fiscal Year 1999, many months before the fiscal year ended. While
lawmakers and employers wrangle over long-term solutions to the problem
of the labor shortage," the immediate fix is to fill these positions on
178. Id.
179. Review & Outlook (Editorial),Mr. Smith's Labors, WALL ST. J.,July 14, 1998, at A18.
180. Including the Price Waterhouse Coopers survey.
181. Review & Outlook (Editorial),Mr. Smith's Labors,supra note 179.
182. Id.
183. See ACWIA § 411.
184. These include Government-sponsored scholarships and training programs, as well as
similar programs funded by the corporate sector. These will be discussed in some detail later in this
article.
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demand by hiring from the global labor market. Employers want to be able
to fill these positions as needed and on demand, preferably with domestic
labor. When there is no adequate domestic labor supply from which to
draw satisfactory personnel, the only other source of labor is the non-U.S.
labor market. When the H-lB cap is reached, however, this global labor
pool is effectively cut-off, and U.S. employers feel it at their bottom line.
Anti-immigration proponents, such as FAIR, who oppose the H-iB
program as a threat to "American know-how and ingenuity, ' are in effect
opposing the concept of the free market-in this case, the free global labor
market.
Despite a slowdown ordered by INS headquarters in the processing of
H-1B visas during Fiscal Year 1999,186 and despite the provision in the
ACWIA which nearly doubled the availability of H-1B visas for Fiscal
Years 1999 and 2000, the 115,000-visa cap for Fiscal Year 1999 was
officially reached on June 15, 1999,' 8 -- three and one-half months before
the end of the fiscal year. This amounts to severing the professional labor
supply lines of U.S. employers, and greatly concerns employers "as large
as Microsoft and as small as Richland, [Washington's] six-employee XL
' The founder of this six-employee company, Mr. Ben Peng,
Sci-Tech."188
recruited a University of Akron post-graduate to work on two of XL SciTech's medical research projects, "including one funded under a two-year
federal grant."' 89 Mr. Peng was concerned that the cap could cause his
small company to lose this key person: "'If it's five months until I have this
person, that's five months lost. If it's 12 months, I may not be able to have
this person."" 9° Sheri Lee, the Human Resources Director of Bsquare, a
Bellevue, Washington software development firm which employs about
300 persons, "said the limit 'means we may not be able to fill positions. It
impacts our ability to expand and grow as a company."'
Characterizing the H-lB cap as a limit on how many H-1B visas are
issued each year is a misnomer. The limit actually applies to the number
of persons who are "classified as H-1 B nonimmigrants,"'' 92 not the number
of visas issued. Thus, only H-1B beneficiaries either not in the United
States, or in the United States, 93 but in a visa category other than H- I B, are

185. FAIR (visited June 1, 1999) <http://www.fairus.org>.
186. To allow slow INS processing centers to catch up to.the faster ones.
187. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S ASSOC., INS Announces that H-1B Cap
Reached, Procedures to Be Implemented for Impacted Cases; Relief for Certain Fs and Js, (June 15,
1999).
188. Ervin, supra note 8.
189. Ervin, supra note 8.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(8)(i)(A) (1998).
193. Persons not in the United States do not have a U.S. immigration status because U.S.
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subject to the cap. This created a problem for persons in the U.S. in another
visa status who had H- I B petitions pending with the INS when the cap was
reached.
One of the greatest sources of new, young talent in the high-technology
labor force is United States colleges and universities. 194William T. Archey,
the President and C.E.O. of the American Electronics Association, stated
before Congress:
In 1996, 38 percent of all Master of Science degrees in
computer science by U.S. universities were awarded to
foreign nationals. And 46 percent of all Ph.D.s in computer
science were awarded to non-U.S. citizens. These individuals
have the requisite education and skills to make a major
contribution to the global competitiveness of the U.S. hightechnology industry by creating new jobs and products ....
The technologies and other innovations produced by foreign
nationals have helped industry reach its worldwide leadership
position.195
Mr. Archey noted that the one way to meet the demand created by "the
current high-tech labor shortage is to employ technically skilled foreign
nationals, especially those educated in U.S. universities ....
Unfortunately,
these workers require H-1B visas ....The cap on skilled workers is a
hindrance for the growing and dynamic high-technology industry."'96
With so many H-1B candidates coming out of United States postsecondary colleges and universities, particularly those graduating in the
month of June, and the recent history of the H-I B visa cap being reached
in the summer, if not sooner, foreign national students with H-i B petitions
pending at the INS when the cap is reached end up in an immigration status
limbo. Students, who typically hold either F-i or J-1 visa status, are
accorded their student status not until a date certain, but for the duration of
their student programs. 97 If the student graduates in June, his or her
student status terminates in June. Thus, those students who have H-1B
petitions pending when the cap is reached have a status problem. This is
what practitioners refer to as being "stuck under the cap."
In the past, such students would not be permitted to work for their
new U.S. employers until their H- 1B petitions were approved after October

immigration law cannot be applied beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
194. See HearingsBefore the House JudiciaryComm. Subcomm. on Immigrationand Claims,
106th Congress (Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of William T. Archey, Pres. of the American Electronics
Assoc.).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f(5) (1998).
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1, the beginning of the next Fiscal Year,'98 and would be forced to depart
the U.S. once their post-study "grace periods" expired.' 9 9 For this reason,
the INS imposed special rules when the Fiscal Year 1999 cap was reached,
which allow students with H-lB petitions stuck under the cap, and their
dependents, "to remain in the United States lawfully until their H-l b [sic]
employment is effective."' 0 However, the new INS rule is quite specific
in noting that "ft~hey may not work during this period,although they are
not precluded from receiving signing bonuses typically given to similar
new employees of the petitioning company." '0 This is an interesting
change of heart on the part of the INS for two reasons: 1) the regulations
promulgated by the Act are generally adamant that only aliens with
authorization to work may be permitted to take compensation while in the
U.S.; 20 2 and 2) the immigration laws contain various safeguards against
aliens becoming public charges in the U.S.2 °3 Thus, the INS does not
loosely grant permission for foreign nationals in the U.S. to accept
employment or to receive income. This is particularly contrary to the grain
of the U.S. immigration laws when one considers that there is no reason to
assume that an H- 1B employer has agreed to pay a student stuck under the
cap a bonus for agreeing to work for that company. The
student/prospective H-l B employee could very easily be in the U.S. with
no family support and no income for several months until the government
approves the H- I B visa petition, and the employer is permitted to put the
employee on the payroll.
In light of the fact that so many of the H-lB employees being hired by
U.S. companies are being recruited straight out of baccalaureate and post-

198. Unless they have valid employment authorization from the INS, available to F-I students
as Optional Practical Training. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(10)(ii) (1998).
199. The INS regulations provide for a 60-day period following the termination of an F-I
student's study or Optional Practical Training to depart the U.S. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i)
(1998).
200. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., Press

Release from the INS Office of Business Liaison, Attention Employers! H-lB Cap Issues-Fiscal
Year 99, (June 15, 1999).

201. Id. (emphasis in original).
202. The Foreign Affairs Manual at 9 FAM § 41.31 lists several notes which explain how
certain individuals in particular occupations, and under particular circumstances, may enter the U.S.
for short stays in a visitor status. The common mantra for each of these qualifications is the
language "that no salary or remuneration will be paid from a U.S. source."
203. See e.g. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(9)(i) (1998) (discussing INS employment authorization for

certain students who can show "that... employment is necessary to avoid severe economic
hardship resulting from.., emergent circumstances"); INA § 213A (setting forth requirements for
an "affidavit of support," a binding contract under which sponsoring relatives of family-based
immigrants are financially liable, in a legally enforceable sense, to the Government should their
immigrating relatives consume any means-tested public benefit within five years of immigrating to
the U.S.).
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graduate programs at our own universities, most commentators,
restrictionists and pro-immigration advocates alike, agree that a long-term
solution to the shortage of qualified, professional workers in the United
States is in the education of our own citizens. 204 A report to the President
of the United States on this issue summed up the problem and the available
solutions well:
By virtual unanimity, chief executive officers of a crosssection of America's leading corporations have identified the
need to strengthen the technological work-force as the single
greatest challenge to U.S. competitiveness over the next
decade. In its Interim Report to the President, the [President's
Information Technology Advisory C]ommittee recommended
increasing the number of H-lB visas as a short-term measure,
but this solution is untenable for the long term .

. .

. A

complete solution to the work-force problem would involve
recruiting from underrepresented groups as well as
nationwide excellence in K- 12 education.
In response to this demonstrated need for U.S. citizen graduates of our
educational system to be competent to perform sufficiently in the specialty
occupations currently being filled by foreign nationals via the H- IB visa
program, Congress amended the Act to require the enhanced $500 H-lB
filing fee discussed earlier.2" This fee is supposed to be used for "job
training, scholarships and grants, and enforcement of the H-lB
program. 20 7 Six percent of the new fee goes to the DOL for enforcement
and administration of the H- IB provisions under its charge, with the caveat
that the agency brings its adjudication periods for LCAs into compliance
with the seven-day requirement set forth by the DOL's own regulations.08
Another 1.5% of the proceeds from the enhanced H-1B filing 2fee
is to go
09
into the coffers of the INS "to reduce H-1B processing time.,
The $500 fee is collectible both when a U.S. employer files an initial
H-I B petition for a nonimmigrant, and when it files an amended petition

204. See HearingsBefore the House JudiciaryComm. Subcomm. on ImmigrationandClaims,
106th Congress (Mar. 25, 1999) (statement ofWilliam T. Archey, Pres. of the American Electronics
Assoc.); Rick Boyd-Merritt, People Problem, ELECTRONIC ENG'G TIMES 1052, 1052 (Mar. 15,
1999); The Sham High-Tech Worker Shortage, FAIR (visited June 1, 1999)
<http://www.fairus.org>.
205. Boyd-Merritt, supranote 204, at 1052 (quoting the report by the President's Information
Technology Advisory Committee, Feb. 24, 1999).
206. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b) (1998).
207. New H-IB Fee Takes Effect, INS Publishes Regulations, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1690, 1690 (Dec. 14, 1998).
208. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., supra note 151.
209. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., supra note 151.
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due to the employee having previously worked for another U.S.
corporation under H- 1B visa status.2 ' This fee should produce a minimum
of $53,187,500 per fiscal year to fund scholarships and training programs
for high-technology high school and university programs in the United
States.2 Assuming an average tuition rate of$15,000 per year, this should
fund one year of post-secondary education for 3,545 U.S. students per
fiscal year. Assuming the scholarship program can continue to fund hightechnology educations at this rate for four years,2" 2 the length of time
required to graduate a government-subsidized specialty occupation worker
under this program, the new H-1B enhanced fee could only fill
approximately one-half of the vacant software-related jobs in the State of
Washington alone.2 13 Thus, when one considers all the vacant professional
positions in all fields qualifying as specialty occupations in all fifty states,
it becomes clear that the scholarship program, while a good idea in theory,
put a dent in the high-technology labor shortage in this
will hardly
2 14
country.

Also, it is important to bear in mind that the H-lB visa program
concerns jobs requiring "attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the
specific specialty (or its. equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the
occupation in the United States. '2 5 Thus, funding university scholarships
at the baccalaureate-level or higher is consistent with the Act's own
definition of the nature of an H-lB employee's qualifications. Using the
scholarship program to fund training programs is not. Specifically, if an
H- 1B foreign national requires a bachelor's degree or better in a given field

210. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., supra note 151.
211. Calculated as follows: $500 less 7.5 percent ($37.50) for INS and DOL efficiency
incentives = $462.50 per petition for the scholarship program. The figure assumes an H- lB visa cap
of 115,000 in the fiscal year. This figure is the floor for such a program (assuming perfect economic
efficiency) because H-I B employees changing employers will each generate an additional $462.50
for the fund.
212. Of course, it cannot, because the H-IB visa cap will be reduced incrementally to return
to 65,000 by Fiscal Year 2002, discussed supra.
213. See Ervin, supra note 8 (referring to a 1998 survey commissioned by the Washington
Software Alliance).
214. This assumes that U.S. workers with no relevant post-secondary education are being
converted to professional specialty occupation employees via full-blown four-year baccalaureate
programs. Alternatively, ifthe funds go toward training partially qualified U.S. workers instead, and
assuming the same $15,000 cost per student annually, the number of new U.S. workers qualified
for specialty occupations would increase proportionately. If one year of training is required, the
program would produce four times as many qualified U.S. workers. If two years of training is
required, the program would yield twice as many, etc. Of course, this would assume that less-thanfour-year "training" programs would result in a U.S. worker with the same qualifications as a
worker with a dedicated four-year bachelors degree in the field of endeavor in question. This article
will go on to explain that the standards under the immigration laws do not necessarily permit this.
215. INA § 214(i)(1)(B) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l)(B) (1998)).
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of expertise, so would a U.S. citizen. Thus, training programs not rising to
the level of a four-year degree program could not possibly reduce U.S.
employers' reliance on nonimmigrant professionals" 6 . Although, there is
a provision in the H- IB regulations for persons to qualify for the category
if they do not possess a college degree,2" 7 the applicable regulation allows
for persons with three years of relevant experience to be deemed to possess
one year of post-secondary education."' Accordingly, an on-the-job
training program would take twelve years to completely prepare an
uneducated U.S. worker to be eligible to meet the minimum requirements
of a professional specialty occupation.
H-1B nonimmigrants do not generally have an easy route to legal
permanent residence or "green card" status in the United States. With a
few exceptions, generally all persons wishing to immigrate, that is live
permanently in the United States based on their employment, must obtain
a labor certification, from the DOL before petitioning the INS for
immigrant status. 2 9 Labor certification amounts to a test of the local labor
market for U.S. workers who are ready, willing and able to serve in the
permanent position to be filled by the foreign national. It is here that the
regulations governing immigrant and nonimmigrant visa status clash. H- l B
nonimmigrant visa status was created as an avenue through which U.S.
employers could quickly (the term is used loosely) obtain foreign national
professionals who are the best and brightest. 22' However, if the employer
wishes to keep this employee permanently, in order to have the DOL
approve the requisite labor certification, the U.S. company must show that
there are no U.S. workers available and minimally qualified to do the
job.22'
To put this in perspective, we will assume that a United States
manufacturer of engineered products has just acquired a smaller company
and wishes to operate it as a division. The target entity was formally owned
by a European parent, and utilizes a German-based integrated computer
hardware and software system known under the brand name SAP. The U.S.
purchaser/employer has been using the American counterpart to SAP,
known as Oracle. The U.S. employer recruits for a computer professional
with "cross platform" experience to integrate the newly acquired SAP
system with the existing Oracle systems,222 in order to make the new
216. Unless, of course, the U.S. candidates for the position already posses the requisite
education, but less-than-cutting-edge expertise.
217. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5) (1998).
218. See id.
219. See INA § 203(b)(3)(C) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(C) (1998)).
220. See Review & Outlook (Editorial),Mr. Smith's Labors, supra,note 179.
221. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.24(b)(2) (1998).
222. This type of qualification frequently commands salaries upwards of $100,000 per year,
and few U.S. workers possess the necessary skills and education for cross-platform applications.
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division as profitable as possible, as quickly as possible. Assume that ten
candidates are interviewed for the position, all of whom have the requisite
education and experience for the job. However, the best candidate is a
foreign national, and that candidate is hired under the rationale that he or
she is the superior applicant. After some time, the employer is very happy
with the H-l B employee and wishes to employ him or her permanently,
thus requiring a labor certification in order to obtain a green card.
However, the minimum requirements for the position are a Bachelor of
Science degree in Computer Science, and two to four years of experience
in both Oracle and SAP consulting, including cross-platform projects.
Under the DOL's rule, a poor candidate (for example, one who has an
unsatisfactory attitude, or who has not held a past job for more than a few
months) who happens to possess the minimum education and experience
requirements for the job, and who happened to be born in the U.S., upon
applying for the position, would cause the DOL to deny the labor
certification. It is not relevant that the U.S. worker may not be the best
candidate for the job, or even an adequate one by standards other than
meeting minimal education and experience requirements. If the U.S.
worker possesses only the bare minimum requirements for the position, the
rising star that the company recruited from abroad and who made the new
division profitable by getting two unrelated computer systems to
communicate with one another, cannot keep the job permanently. The
result is that the U.S. employer loses the rising star because the DOL's
mission is to protect U.S. workers.223
This contradiction in the immigration law has become exacerbated by
a breakdown in the DOL's ability to timely and properly adjudicate labor
224 This breakdown, frequently referred to as an agency
certifications.
' by practitioners,
"meltdown"225
is due to a number of factors, most notably
drastic funding cuts to DOL labor certification programs.226 Unlike the
INS, which funds much of its own operations by levying filing fees for
petitions and applications for immigration benefits, the DOL has no system
in place to collect fees for the adjudication of labor certifications or LCAs.
However, there has been a substantial improvement in labor certification
adjudication processing times since the implementation of the automated
LCA fax processing system in the Summer of 1999. Nonetheless, it is no
picnic for a U.S. employer to obtain a green card for its best and brightest

223. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., Agency in Meltdown: Department of
Labor Puts Brakes on Business Immigration, available to AILA members at <www.aila.org>,
(visited on May 27, 1999).
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. See id. (noting that the federal budget for labor certification programs between 1993 and
1997 was cut by 59%).
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H-I B employees; and frequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain
a green card for an H- IB employee within the time he or she has remaining
on his or her six-year H-l B clock.
One would logically assume that the immigration law provides for a
simpler, expedited way to obtain permanent resident visa status on behalf
of H-l B employees by virtue of the fact that comparable U.S. workers are
so difficult to find. Actually, there is such a method, known as "Schedule
'
A."227
Schedule A is a list of occupations for which the DOL has precertified a shortage of qualified workers in the U.S.22 ' While this would
seem to be the answer for hard-to-find professionals from abroad to be able
to become permanent assets to the U.S. employers who have put so much
time, effort and money into securing them, Schedule A is treated as an
orphan by the DOL and left to gather dust as an antiquity-not unlike the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles discussed supra. With the exception of
' for whom there are other avenues
"[a]liens ... of exceptional ability,"229
resorting to labor certification,2 30
without
residence
to obtain permanent
Schedule A acknowledges shortages of ample, qualified U.S. workers in
the occupations of physical therapy 3' and certain professional nursing
jobs. 32 It is well established that H-1B visa numbers are being used at an
alarming rate.2 33 Thus, it would seem to make sense to expand Schedule A.
However, as AILA notes:
[I]mplementation [by the DOL] of [fast-track labor
certification] . . . programs has been inconsistent and
unenthusiastic .... DOL also consistently has refused to
certify "shortage" occupations under its current regulations,
even when overwhelming evidence exists ....
Further,
despite a statutory mandate in 1990 to develop a "shortage
occupations" pilot program, the Department [of Labor] never
implemented such a program.234
Accordingly, it appears clear, perhaps due to inadequate funding or training
of its personnel, that the DOL is either incapable or unwilling to perform
its delegated functions in applying and executing the U.S. immigration law
as mandated by Congress.
227. 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (1998).
228. See id.
229. 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(b) (1998).
230. See INA § 203(b)(1)(A) & (B) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(1)(A) & (B) (1998)).
231. See 20 C.F.R. § 656. 10(a)(1) (1998).
232. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(a)(2) (1998).
233. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYER'S Assoc., supra note 187.
234. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., Agency in Meltdown: Department of Labor
Puts Brakes on Business Immigration (1999), available to AILA members at <www.aila.org>
(visited on May 27, 1999).
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As this article established previously, processing for business
immigration benefits at the INS, the DOL and SESAs has been criticized
by practitioners as a hindrance creating a rift between the real-world needs
of this country's employers and the government agencies' ability to apply
various aspects of the immigration laws pursuant to their respective
congressional mandates. Delays associated with adjudications of
immigration petitions, prevailing wage determinations, LCAs and labor
certifications are not the only points of contention. 2" The INS has come
under heavy fire by U.S. employers, practitioners, the media and members
of Congress for, not only its inability to administer the immigration laws
properly and efficiently,236 but for its ineffective channels of
communication. Practitioners have become so accustomed to
communication breakdowns and "customer service" problems with the INS
and other federal immigration-related agencies, that they understand the
problem is attributable to mission overload.2 37 The law simply changes too
fast for the agencies to cope. However, mission overload has not allayed
observations such as Senator Spencer Abraham's call for reformation of
the structure of the INS:
Sen. Abraham said that service concerns include inadequate
attention to customer service, unequal priority and attention

235. All of these agency operations occur within the United States, and thus are at least subject
to various checks and safeguards against abuse such as the Constitution and the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946. However, judicial remedies such as these are rarely pursued by practitioners
simply because they take too long to implement. A U.S. employer who needs to hire an individual
for a critical project within the next three weeks is generally not willing to file an action in Federal
court in order to obtain a desired outcome from an improper agency decision. It is also worth noting
that a key operation in the immigration law, the processing of visa applications at U.S. embassies
and consulates abroad, occurs solely outside the territorial boundaries of the United States, and
thus, is outside the purview of the courts. See Consular Nonreviewability--A Reexamination, 64
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1012, 1012 (Sept. 4, 1987). Such extraconstitutional aspects of the U.S.
immigration law, coupled with Congress' plenary power over the admission of aliens to the United
States, make immigration law a practice area strategically diverse from almost all other areas of law.
236. See Senate Holds Hearingon INS Reform, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 877,877-78 (June
29, 1998).
237. There are still aspects of the IMMACT90 amendments to the INA, now nearly ten years
old, that have not yet been implemented by the various agencies. Each time Congress amends the
Act, statutes must be drafted from the amendments, regulations must be promulgated from the
statutes by the various agencies, and procedures must be implemented by agency adjudicatory
personnel-almost none of whom have legal or paralegal training. Further, these "procedures"
frequently require the development of legal forms, software, and highly technical hardware that
sometimes does not even exist, e.g. the automated biometric scanning devices mandated by IIRIRA
§ 104(b)(2), which Congress demanded be in place and operational on the Mexican border by
October 1, 1999. The INS recently issued a legal opinion explaining away that deadline. See Legal
OpinionDiscussesNew Biometric BorderCrossingCards,76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 594, 594-95
(Apr. 19, 1999).
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paid to the service side, a general "mission overload," and a
lack of accountability. "Agency service has been all too
frequently marred by long waits, lost files, rude treatment, and
unanswered phones," he said, adding that basic information
is "notoriously difficult" to get from the INS. Sen. Abraham
said that the overall goals in providing immigration services
and benefits should be: (1) to provide benefits in a timely,
efficient, and courteous manner to those who qualify for
them; (2) not to provide benefits to those who are unqualified
to receive them, but to give an accurate explanation for the
rejection; and (3) to refer for enforcement any criminal or
other enforcement matters that come to attention in the course
of granting benefits and services.23
In fact, former Commissioner of the INS, Gene McNary, has even called
for the INS to be removed from the auspices of the Department of Justice
and to "report directly to the President, either at the Cabinet level or as an
independent agency.239
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE

H- l B

PROGRAM

While the H- IB visa category is the most broad-based vehicle by which
to obtain foreign national professionals-hence its popularity among hightechnology companies-it is not the only weapon in the U.S. employer's
arsenal. Provided either the company and/or the foreign national meet
certain criteria, there are other nonimmigrant visa categories through which
U.S. employers may obtain the services of certain personnel. Some ofthese
categories can be used in place of the H-l B category when the regulatory
requirements are too onerous (either from a paperwork burden standpoint
or by virtue of the long processing times involved), or when the
government simply runs out of H-1B visas, as it has for the last three fiscal
years-provided, of course, that the petitioner and beneficiary qualify for
them. 24" The following are examples of some of the alternatives to the
H- l B Visa Program.

238. Senate Holds Hearingon INS Reform, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 877, 877-78 (June 29,
1998).
239. CongressionalReport Finds Widespread Problems at INS, Recommends Changes, 70
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1198 (Sept. 13, 1993).
240. There are other employment-based nonimmigrant visa categories in addition to those
listed in this section. However, they are not discussed here due to the fact that the categories almost
never would be applied to persons otherwise classifiable as H-IB professionals.
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1. TN Visas
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (the
24 1
NAFTA).
Under the NAFTA, citizens of Canada and Mexico are eligible to enter
the U.S. to serve in certain identified professional occupations for a period
of one year.242 While the NAFTA is silent as to any limitation on the
number of consecutive TN visas one may apply for, the INS usually will
not permit application for TN visa status beyond the third or fourth
renewal. This de facto limitation is not set forth in the NAFTA or the INS
regulations. Rather, it appears to be grounded in the INS's own contention
that renewal of TN visas for indefinite periods of years is inconsistent with
the notion of TN status being accorded to nonimmigrants, i.e. a temporary
visa status.
2. L-1 Intracompany Transferee Visas.
As discussed earlier, the L-1 visa category was established to permit
larger companies with parents, affiliates, joint ventures and subsidiaries
abroad to transfer key executive, managerial and specialized knowledge
personnel into the United States.2 43 The L- 1A visa category, for executive
and managerial personnel, provides for a maximum stay in the U.S. of
seven years. 244 L-1B specialized knowledge personnel may remain in the
U.S. for a maximum of five years.24 5
3. E-1 Treaty Trader and E-2 Treaty Investor Visas.
This is a visa category by which certain citizens of countries which
have treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with the United
States may establish a U.S. operation, deemed to have the same nationality
as its shareholders.246 The E-lI/E-2 company may then employ persons of
the same nationality as the company in the United States under E visa
status. 247 E nonimmigrants are not required to specify a finite limit to their
intended stay in the U.S., 241 in stark contrast to the way the INS treats the
authorized stays of TN nonimmigrants.

241.
296, 612
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.6 (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(I)(1)(i) (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(I)(12)(i) (1998).
See id.
See 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e)(3) (1998).
See 9 FAM § 41.51.14 (1998).
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4. F-1 Students.
The F-I student visa category permits foreign nationals to come to the
U.S. to study at our academic institutions.249 However, the F-I student visa
regulations also provide for two types of "practical training. 2 10 Curricular
practical training permits F-i students to "participate in a curricular
practical training program which is an integral part of an established
curriculum. Curricular practical training is defined to be alternate
work/study, internship, cooperative education, or any other type of required
internship or practicum which is offered by sponsoring employers through
cooperative agreements with the school., 25 ' This type of practical training
can be authorized by a designated official at the F-I student's school by
simply endorsing a form, without INS oversight. 2 In practice, this type of
employment authorization is sometimes utilized beyond the scope
authorized by the INS-either by universities which intentionally use its
blanket employment authorization for foreign national students, or (more
likely) by university officials who simply do not clearly understand the
limitations on curricular practical training. The other type is optional
practical training, which requires INS approval and issuance of an
Employment Authorization Document." 3 Optional practical training is a
blanket employment authorization and is valid for up to one year. 54
5. J-1 Exchange Visitors.
The J- 1visa category is intended for exchange visitors who come to the
U.S. to participate in some type of exchange program blessed by the United
States Information Agency (USIA), a subdivision of the Department of
State.25 5 If the exchange program, under which the J-1 exchange visitor is
in the U.S. involves the employment of the nonimmigrant, and the J-1
nonimmigrant's program is not that of a student, it is permissible to
employ the J-1 foreign national within the terms of the exchange program
in question.256
Each of the alternatives

above have their limitations:

TN

See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(O(1)(i) (1998).
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(10)(i),(ii) (1998).
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(l 1) (1998); 22 C.F.R. § 54.24 (1998).
Howard D. Shapiro, Exchange Categories (J & Q), in 1999-00 IMMIGRATION &
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK, Vol. 1, IMMIGRATION BASICS 203 (American Immigration Lawyers
Asso'n eds., 1999).
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
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nonimmigrants must be Mexican or Canadian; L nonimmigrants must be
employed by entities with the proper qualifying corporate relationships as
set forth in the L visa regulations; E-l and E-2 nonimmigrants must bear
the same nationality as the employing company in the U.S., and the
company must be a proper E visa entity registered with the consulate or
embassy of the company's nationality;257 F-1 students are limited to a
maximum of one year of practical training, sometimes limited to
employment through internship programs under cooperative agreements
.already in existence with the school; and J-1 exchangees are limited to
employment permitted by their USIA-approved exchange programs. While
a prudent U.S. employer should try to exploit these non-H-1B visa
categories whenever possible,25 none of them permit a company to handpick an individual who they feel is best-qualified for a specialty occupation
from the global labor pool free from the restrictions inherent in each
alternative category.
V. PROPOSED REMEDIES AND IMPROVEMENTS

Despite claims to the contrary, there is a shortage of qualified U.S.
workers to fill professional specialty occupations in the United States, and
the H- IB visa program is viewed by domestic employers as the best viable
short-term solution to the problem. The long-term solution to the problem
is to educate Americans within our educational system to be prepared to
fill these positions. No U.S. employer would logically wish to undergo the
time, trouble, and expense of obtaining H-l B visas and, ultimately, green
cards, for foreign nationals recruited to fill these positions. Furthermore,
while claims, and indeed, documented cases of abuse of the H-1B visa
program exist, the enforcement remedies also exist-they are simply not
being implemented by the INS and DOL. As with any rule, the H-lB visa
regulations have no value or authority as long as they are not enforced. The
H- IB visa machine may be broken. However, the remedy is not to abandon
the program. The solution is to refine the program so it may be applied to
real-world professional staffing situations the way it was intended. With
some legislative exceptions, the fixes must occur at the agency level.
In the short-term, in order to permit domestic enterprises to compete in
the world marketplace, and to avoid U.S. companies being put in a position
where they are forced to move high-technology jobs overseas, it is clearly
257. See 9 FAM § 41.51, Note 3.2 (1998).
258. The reasons for this are the positive benefits built into each alternative visa category.
Also, with the exception to the TN visa category as applied to Mexican citizens, none of these
alternatives to the H-i B visa program are subject to prevailing wage regulations or any of the other
attestations required of an LCA.
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within the interest of the country to relax and to refine the H-l B program
at the agency level. Both the INS and the DOL are currently far from being
efficient in fundamental service oriented operations. All of the INS service
centers must timely and accurately process H-iB visa petitions, and
improve their lines of communication with the outside world. The DOL
must continue to improve its ability to process LCAs, and labor
certifications within reasonable time frames. Once these agencies
(particularly the DOL) have raised adjudications and communications to
a level of competence satisfactory to the United States employers who
depend on them (not the INS's or DOL's own perceptions of what is
competent), they should concentrate on detecting fraud and LCA violations
in the workplace and levying sanctions as appropriate. Each agency should
take great care not to become overzealous in its enforcement of its
respective regulations, thus losing sight of the forest for the trees. After all,
the purpose of the enforcement sanctions is to prevent, discourage and
punish violations of the regulations-not to make it more difficult, or even
impossible, for U.S. companies to use H-lB nonimmigrants when they
require them. Both of these agencies have great difficulty in separating
their adjudicatory roles from their proper enforcement activities-an
underlying inclination to find fault in the application or petition in question
in order to deny it.
Also within the scope of the short-term, Congress should consider
floating the H-lB visa cap to correspond to realistic demand by U.S.
employers for workers they cannot locate domestically. They could
suspend it temporarily or eliminate it for an indefinite period in order to
permit scholarship programs to supply the workforce with domestic
professionals. Clearly, the current 115,000 limit on H-lB visas is not
adequate to meet demand, and the limit is only going to diminish over the
next three years. The H-i B scholarship program, while a good idea and on
the right track, cannot come close to closing the gap between supply and
demand of professional specialty occupation workers in the United States.
Congress must look to the status of real world education and employment
conditions to establish any limits on the H-lB program. Asking qualified
experts how many visas should be available, and for how long, and then
reducing the number in compromise in order to pacify dissenting
constituents, is counter-productive and fails to solve the short-term
problem.
Further, if Congress amended the Act to permit a reasonably tenable
waiver of the labor certification requirement for certain H- 1B occupations,
the DOL could spend less time processing labor certifications, and more
time on enforcement. This would create more permanently employed
foreign nationals in professional occupations, thus reducing the demand for
fresh H- 1B labor. Also, the DOL could simply perform its congressionally
mandated function of establishing a certified shortage occupation pilot
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program. Of course, in order for such a program to be successful, the DOL
must actually certify shortage occupations-not hide behind a facade that
high-demand H-lB occupations are not in short supply in the U.S., like the
DOL's alleged maintenance of Schedule A. A good gauge of what should
be a certified shortage occupation is the H-i B visa program itself. The
DOL could simply tabulate the occupations from LCAs it already has on
file to identify high-demand occupations, thus avoiding gross changes in
procedure.
Of course, the long-term solution here is encourage United States
citizens and permanent residents, at a young age, to study mathematics and
the sciences, and to pursue university-level degrees in those disciplines." 9
Contrary to Congress' posture implied by the H-lB scholarship program,
the ACWIA is not going to create a pool of hundreds of thousands of
additional U.S. workers qualified to serve in specialty occupations by
2002. The scholarship program makes sense, and U.S. industry is
following suit by spending money and resources on education. However,
it does not amount to a sweeping change of heart by America's youth as to
which majors to pursue in college, or even whether to attend postsecondary institutions at all.
Congress, and the subordinated agencies in charge of administering the
U.S. immigration laws, must always keep the following in mind: we are
now living and working in a global economy. If protectionist or
restrictionist attitudes continue to pervade the immigration laws, rendering
them impracticable or impossible to utilize, two obvious short-term
solutions will arise: 1) move the jobs abroad to the source of the required
professional labor; or 2) outsource and utilize manufacturers and service
organizations abroad for the high-technology products and services
required by corporate consumers of such goods and services worldwide.
Either scenario keeps the U.S. company profitable, which is its primary
concern. However, either scenario also pumps jobs, or money, or both out
of the U.S. economy. Therefore, Congress should impress upon these
agencies an acknowledgment that protection of U.S. workers is not the
end-all, be-all reason for their existence. There is a greater good they must
serve.
Finally, H-1 B visa petitions are almost always prepared by attorneys,
specially trained paralegal personnel, or individuals on staff at the U.S.
employers themselves who are thoroughly educated and versed in
legislative and regulatory requirements of employment-based immigration.
Ironically, the INS adjudicating officers, whose responsibility it is to make
legal determinations on these and other immigration filings, are not
attorneys. Nor are they supervised by attorneys. Many are career

259. See Boyd-Merritt, supra note 204.
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government employees, many are trained in enforcement techniques (e.g.
arrests, detention, use of firearms, etc.), and many are former military
personnel. If this article has established anything, it proves that the H-lB
visa requirements and effects are exceedingly complex and difficult to
understand, even for seasoned lawyers and members of Congress and their
staffs. The INS Nebraska Service Center, at the time the author toured it,
employed several hundred individuals, but only one attorney. Also, this
attorney had no direct oversight of the hundreds of legal determinations
being made by INS adjudicators every day.
Perhaps the INS and the DOL could endeavor to employ adjudicators
with experience and education in disciplines related to law, business and
labor relations to increase efficiency and to decrease, or eliminate, the
often-complained-of processing delays, errors, lost files and unprofessional
attitude frequently exhibited by these agencies. Failing that, the INS and
DOL should at least design an incentive system under which adjudicators
who do their jobs correctly and efficiently receive some type of bonus for
a job well done. After all, employers and practitioners are not the
adversaries of the INS and DOL. We are all trying to cope with unclear
rules, inadequate government funding and improper Congressional fixes
to a severe problem.
VI. CONCLUSION

The H-1B program can work properly if the suggestions discussed
above are fully and properly implemented to maximize agency efficiency,
with additional flexibility in the number of H-lB visas available per fiscal
year, in concert with feasible pro-education programs in place for a longterm solution. The current attitude of going to great efforts to determine
feasible solutions, only to undermine them in order to keep antiimmigration constituents happy, is a no-win proposition, and serves only
to perpetuate the problem. The focus of U.S. immigration law, and of those
agencies empowered to enforce it, must shift to a more global scope. If this
cannot be achieved, as a matter of basic economic survival, the United
States could find its high-technology manufacturers moving operations to
places where they can employ the professional labor they greatly require.
Congress must train itself to think globally if we are to remain competitive
in the world economy.
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VIl. AFTERWORD
This Article was researched and written in the Summer of 1999. By the
time it was edited for publishing some events transpired in employmentbased immigration practice which should be noted.
First, the DOL has refined further its efforts to bring LCA adjudications
to within the seven-day limit imposed by its own regulations.26 This most
pleasant result is likely in response to the promise of additional funding
from the $500 enhanced H-1B visa fee if adjudications are made timely,
discussed supra.
Nonetheless, there are still occasions of properly filed LCAs seeming
to vanish as the system is still experiencing growing pains. On September
23, 1999, the DOL cheerfully reported to AILA that the "Automated LCA
Faxback System has been operating without problems for the last six
weeks ... ,,26I However, the DOL admitted to continued glitches in this
system on October 20 and again on November 3, 1999.262 On the whole,
the author can report that LCA adjudications are now almost consistently
within the regulatory seven-day limit for the first time in recent years.
Practitioners are thrilled by the results. With the DOL utilizing the
automated LCA Faxback system, not only are LCAs being adjudicated
within reasonable (and even legal) time frames, DOL personnel are now
free to adjudicate Labor Certifications-the next administrative hurdle the
DOL must conquer.
The thorny issue of the H-lB visa cap, unfortunately, continues to be
a problem. Since this article was written, Fiscal Year 1999 ended and
Fiscal Year 2000 began. AILA recently reported that the INS "contends
that it has issued visas in excess of the FY 99 cap, and thus will
compensate by, in effect, reducing the FY 2000 cap. 2 63 The actual number
of H-lB petition approvals issued by the INS in excess of the Fiscal Year
1999 cap of 115,000 is reported to be as high as 2 0 ,0 0 0 .26 Accordingly, if
the agency goes through with its plan, the statutory 115,000 H-i B visa cap
for Fiscal Year 2000 will be unilaterally reduced by the INS to about
95,000. This potential reduction has elicted a fervent reaction from
employers and practitioners.

260. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(b) (1998).
261. LCA Faxback System Update (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.aila.org>.
262. See LDA FaxBack System Up and Running!, and DOL Region IX Update on LCAs
(visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.aila.org>.
263. INS H- lB Count Elicits Sharp Congressional Response, ADVOCACY UPDATE,VoI. 3, No.
16, Oct. 8, 1999, available at <http://www.aila.org> (visited Nov. 24, 1999).
264. See INS H-IB Count Elicits Sharp Congressional Response (visited Nov. 24, 1999)
<http://www.aila.org>.
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In response to this most recent blunder in the INS's administration of
the H-lB program, Senator Spencer Abraham, as Chairman of the Senate
Immigration Subcommittee, penned a rather stinging letter to Doris
Meissner, the Commissioner of the INS, dated October 5, 1999. In his
letter, the Senator criticizes the INS's planned remedy to this problem by
expressing to Commissioner Meissner that, "[s]uch action not only would
lack statutory authority but would be based on what time and again has
' The
proven to be inaccurate counting methods utilized by the INS."265
Senator told the INS that,
given past INS counting procedures on Hi-B visas[,] it is far
more likely that the INS miscounted in a manner that deprived
employers of available visas in FY 1999, rather than issued
too many visas. In short, I don't believe it when I hear the
agency tell Congress that now it is counting correctly. In FY
1996, in response to inquiries from industry, and in FY 1997,
in response to my own inquiry, the INS went back and
checked its H1B [sic] counting procedures and concluded in
both instances that it had double counted thousands of visas
visa cap at times
and therefore had not reached the Hi B [sic]266
when the agency had concluded that it had.
The Senator's letter continues:
Considering that the INS slowed processing as early as April
and stopped accepting new petitions for H 1Bs [sic] in June of
this year, it is hard to understand how it could have awarded
too many visas, when it had many months to calibrate visa
issuance. In a letter dated May 13, 1999, I questioned INS
counting methodologies. I have yet to receive a reply to that
letter ....Second, I do not believe the INS possesses the
statutory authority to shift visas from one year to the next. If
it does have that authority, then it would be just as logical for
it to take visas not used in an earlier fiscal year, such as in FY
1994 or FY 1995, and use those numbers against the FY 1999
267
totals as it would be to take visas out of FY 2000 totals.
The context and tone of Senator Abraham's letter to the INS
Commissioner sums up the prevailing attitude of Congress and constituent
employers over the fundamental operations of the INS and the agency's
inadequacies. To date, Commissioner Meissner has yet to express to AILA
265. Abraham Letter to
<http://www.aila.org.>.
266. See id.
267. Id.
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any response to the Senator's concerns. We remain curious to see how this
latest round of head butting between the INS and Congress resolves itself.

